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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: DON'T BLOW IT: THE MOTION TO
SUPPRESS BREATHALYZER EVIDENCE-City of Xenia v. Wallace,
37 Ohio St. 3d 216, 524 N.E.2d 889 (1988).
I.

INTRODUCTION

On June 22, 1988, the Ohio Supreme Court rendered its decision
in City of Xenia v. Wallace.1 Wallace held that the state bears the
burden of going forward with evidence to establish probable cause on a
motion to suppress breathalyzer evidence.2 The state's burden is to respond to a motion to supress which challenges the breathalyzer test by
contending that it is a warrantless search conducted without probable
3
cause.
The analysis of this case note will discuss four aspects of the Ohio
Supreme Court's decision in Wallace. The first section suggests that
the decision is consistent with the burdens of proof necessary in a motion to suppress hearing which challenges evidence seized through a
warrantless search. 4 The second section suggests that the structural
logic of Wallace allows for a broader application of the principles established by the supreme court.5 The third section discusses how the
opinion fits within the framework of other jurisdictions.' The concluding section will briefly discuss the practical effects this case will likely
have on current defense attorney practice.7

II

FACTS AND HOLDING

In City of Xenia v. Wallace,' Lamar E. Wallace was stopped for
speeding while driving his car in Xenia, Ohio.' According to the police
officer who stopped Wallace, there was a strong odor of alcohol present
while he attended to Mr. Wallace.1" Wallace was asked to submit to a
field sobriety test, which he failed." After taking a breathalyzer test,
which resulted in a .124 reading, 2 Mr. Wallace was charged with sev-

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.

37 Ohio St. 3d 216, 524 N.E.2d 889 (1988).
Id. at 218, 524 N.E.2d at 891.
Id.
See infra notes 100-19 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 120-33 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 134-54 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 155-62 and accompanying text.
37 Ohio St. 3d 216, 524 N.E.2d 889 (1988).
Id. at 217, 524 N.E.2d at 890.
Id. at 217, 524 N.E.2d at 891.
Id.
Id.
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1
eral violations, including Xenia Revised Code section 333.01(A)(3). "
A pretrial motion to suppress chemical test evidence was filed by the
defendant Wallace. 14 The basis for the motion was that the evidence
state procedure was not followed
was obtained illegally and that proper
15
test.
breath
the
in administering
Defense counsel questioned the arresting officers during the hearing on the motion."6 The responses elicited by defense counsel tended to
show that the officers noticed the defendant accelerated quickly and
1
also noticed that the engine shifted into high gear.' There was no cross
examination by the prosecution and no state evidence, not even the arrest report, was admitted into the record. 8 During closing arguments,
defense counsel argued that the officers did not have probable cause to
have Mr. Wallace take the breath test. 19 No closing argument was
trial court denied the defendant's momade by the prosecution." The
21
.
evidence
the
tion to suppress
22
At trial, the defendant entered a no contest plea. He was subse3 The Appellate Court for Greene
quently found guilty and appealed.
24
County, Ohio reversed the trial court's decision on the motion. The
appellate court held that once a defendant demonstrates the search was
conducted without a warrant, the burden of going forward is upon the
state to show that it did not violate the fourth and fourteenth amend25
ments of the Constitution of the United States. The court held that

13. Id.; XENIA REVISED CODE § 333.01(A)(3) (1988)(operating a motor vehicle with a concentration of ten-hundredths of one gram or more by weight of alcohol per two hundred ten liters
of breath). Wallace was also charged with violating XENIA REVISED CODE § 333.03(D) (speeding)
and § 333.01(A)(l)(operating a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol). Wallace, 37 Ohio
St. 3d at 217, 524 N.E.2d at 891. Upon request of the prosecutor, both charges were dropped. Id.
Section 333.01(A)(3) is identical to OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4511.19(A)(3) (Anderson 1987), in
that both sections statutorily prohibit operating a motor vehicle with concentrations of alcohol
equaling ten-hundredths of one gram or more by weight of alcohol per two hundred ten liters of
breath.
14. Wallace, 37 Ohio St. 3d at 217, 524 N.E.2d at 891.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id. See generally Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. I (1968)(in order to stop a defendant, a
police officer must have reasonable suspicion that the defendant is violating the law).
18. Wallace, 37 Ohio St. 3d at 217, 524 N.E.2d at 891. The arrest report contained the
evidence that there was a strong odor of alcohol and that Wallace failed a field sobriety test. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.; City of Xenia v. Wallace, No. 86-CA-65, slip op. (2d App. Dist. Feb. 20, 1987).
24. Wallace. 37 Ohio St. 3d at 217, 524 N.E.2d at 891.
25. ld.; U.S. CONST. amend. IV, XIV, § 1; see also Mapp v. Ohio, 387 U.S. 643, 654-57
(applying the fourth amendment exclusionary rule to the states through the due process clause of
the fourteenth amendment).
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the state did not meet that burden.2" The court of appeals then certified
the record for review by the Ohio Supreme Court."
In affirming the lower court's decision, the Ohio Supreme Court
stated that, "the state has the burden of going forward with evidence to
show probable cause once the defendant has demonstrated a warrantless search or seizure and has raised a lack of probable cause as a
ground for attacking the legality of the search or seizure."28
The Wallace decision is divided into three sections. The first section discusses the procedural aspects of the pretrial motion to suppress
evidence.2 9 In this section, the court presents what it considers necessary prerequisites to challenging evidence obtained through a warrantless search or seizure."0 Basing its decision on the need for the prosecution to have notice of the grounds upon which a motion to suppress is
made, 31 the court held:
to suppress evidence obtained pursuant to a warrantless search or
seizure, the defendant must (1) demonstrate the lack of a warrant, and
(2) raise the grounds upon which the validity of the search or seizure is
challenged in such a manner as to give the prosecutor notice of the basis
32
for the challenge.
The second section of the court's opinion addresses who should
bear the burden of going forward with evidence at a suppression hearing.3 3 Specifically, the court addresses this question with respect to a
warrantless search when the challenge presented is based upon a lack
of probable cause for the search. 34 In its discussion, the court examined
three arguments for placing the burden on the state and three arguments for placing the burden on the defense. 35 The arguments for placing the burden upon the state are presented as follows: First, the party
charged with the burden of persuasion on an issue ordinarily has the
burden of going forward with evidence on that issue;3" second, the state
is in a better position to go forward in relation to relevant informa-

26. Wallace, 37 Ohio St. 3d at 217, 524 N.E.2d at 891.
27. Id. at 218, 524 N.E.2d at 891. The lower court.realized that its judgment was in conflict
with the judgment of the Hamilton County Court of Appeals in State v. Banks, C-790217, slip op.
(1st App. Dist. Jan. 20, 1980). Wallace, 37 Ohio St. 3d at 218, 524 N.E.2d at 891; see also infra
notes 81-82 and accompanying text.
28. Wallace, 37 Ohio St. 3d at 218, 524 N.E. 2d at 891.
29. Id. at 217-18, 524 N.E.2d at 891-92.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 219, 524 N.E.2d at 892.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 219-20, 524 N.E.2d at 892-93.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 219-20, 524 N.E.2d at 893.
36. Id. at 219, 524 N.E.2d at 893.
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tion;3 7 third, it is easier for a party to prove the existence of probable
a
cause than for a party to show that probable cause did not exist."
Conversely, the court addressed three arguments in favor of allocating the burden of going forward to the defendant. The first of these
arguments states that there is a presumption of legality with respect to
any law enforcement action.3 9 The second argument is based on a procedural norm that usually requires a movant to put forth evidence to
support his motion."' The last argument considers the needs of both the
prosecution and the court to have notice of the defendant's intended
challenges."'
The Ohio Supreme Court was persuaded by the arguments in
favor of placing the burden of going forward upon the state."2 In explaining its decision, the court wrote:
Law enforcement searches and seizures without the authority of a warrant are, . . as previously mentioned, per se unreasonable. Further, the
theory that the moving party should go forward with evidence, and the
need for the prosecutor and court to be put on notice as to what the
defendant is challenging, are accounted for in our holding that the movant is required to establish a warrantless search or seizure and specify
the grounds of his challenge before the burden of production falls upon
the prosecution.4 3
Next, the court concluded that if a defendant demonstrates a warrantless search and challenges the search's legality upon lack of probable cause, the state will bear the burden of going forward with evidence
to show that probable cause existed. 4
The third section of the opinion applies the two previous sections
of the decision to the specific facts of the case.4 5 The court recognized
that the defendant's motion was unclear." However, the court noted
that the trial court allowed the proceedings to continue, and that the
prosecution did not raise any objections. 7 Defense counsel's questions
made it clear that he intended to prove there was no probable cause to

37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 220, 524 N.E.2d at 893.
40. Id.
41. Id. The notice will allow the prosecution to prepare its case. Secondly, the court must be
informed regarding the basis of the defendant's challenge in order to prepare rulings on evidenciary issues that may arise during the hearing. See id. at 218, 524 N.E.2d at 891.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 220-21, 524 N.E.2d at 893-94.
46. Id. at 220-21, 524 N.E.2d at 893.
47. Id. at 221, 524 N.E.2d at 894.

https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol14/iss3/10

CASENOTE

19891

administer the test." The Wallace court determined that these actions
were sufficient to place the prosecutor on notice. The prosecution did
not put forth any evidence and declined the court's offer to grant additional time to prepare. 0 After considering the situation, the Wallace
court found that the state failed to meet its burden of proof as to probable cause.5"
III.

BACKGROUND

The Wallace opinion raises several important evidentiary issues. In
general, the term "burden of proof" encompasses two distinct burdens. 2 The first burden is the burden of going forward with evidence. 3
The party that bears the burden of going forward must either put forth
evidence on the particular issue or risk an adverse ruling on the issue if
insufficient evidence is produced. 4
The second burden is the burden of persuasion. 5 "The burden of
persuasion becomes a crucial factor only if the parties have sustained
their burdens of producing evidence and only when all of the evidence
has been introduced." 5 The burden of persuasion becomes important
when a decision must be made by the jury.5 7 "When the time for a
decision comes, the jury, if there is one, must be instructed how to
decide the issue if their minds are left in doubt."5 Thus, when the
party that bears the burden of persuasion has not produced enough evidence to convince the trier of fact that its burden of persuasion has
been met, the issue will go against him.5 9 To illustrate, once the evidentiary presentations are complete in a criminal trial, the trier of fact
must determine whether the state has produced enough evidence on an
issue to determine whether the issue is proven beyond a reasonable
doubt."0
It is this burden of initially going forward with evidence that

48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. E. CLEARY, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE 783-84 (2d ed. 1954).
53. Id.
54. Id. at 784. Such a ruling is generally a finding or a directed verdict.
55. Id. at 783-84.
56. Id. at 784.
57. Id.
58. Id. In a bench trial, the judge must resolve this doubt against the party with the burden
of persuasion.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 798-801; see also Speiser v. Randal, 357 U.S. 513, 525-26 (1957)(burden of
persuasion at a criminal trial is beyond a reasonable doubt).
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caused problems for the Ohio judiciary prior to Wallace."' A discussion
of two appellate court cases is useful to demonstrate the conflict in the
lower courts. In the case of State v. Gasser,62 the Court of Appeals for
Paulding County, Ohio held that the state has the burden of going forward with evidence on a pretrial motion to suppress the results of a
blood alcohol test.6 3 In Gasser, the defendant was charged with violating Ohio Revised Code Section 4511.19.64 The defendant moved to
suppress the results of the chemical test of his blood alcohol level. 5
The lower county court suppressed the results of the test.66 The state
filed an appeal, contending that the defendant bears the burden of going forward with evidence on a motion to suppress.6 7 Neither side produced blood alcohol evidence at the suppression hearing.6 8 Therefore,
the state argued, the defendant should have received an adverse ruling. 9 In affirming the lower court's decision, the court of appeals
wrote: "[t]he State is in a much better position to proceed with affirmative proof .... "170 Continuing, the court stated:
It is our opinion on the basis of these considerations that the state, as
well as having the ultimate burden of proof or persuasion, has at a hearing of a pretrial motion the burden of going forward with the evidence to
prove that it has complied with each foundation requirement that the
defendant has set forth in his motion to suppress as not having been
fulfilled."'
In this matter, the Gasser court conclusively stated that, on a pretrial motion to suppress breathalyzer evidence, the state is the party
that bears the burden of going forward with evidence to establish the
legality of its actions.7 2
Compare the decision in Gasser to the opinion of the court in

61. See infra notes 62-82 and accompanying text.
62. 5 Ohio App. 3d 217, 451 N.E.2d 249 (1980).
63. Id. at 220, 451 N.E.2d at 252-53.
64. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 4511.19(A)(1) (Anderson Supp. 1988)(operating a motor vehicle under the influence of alcohol). This statute amended the previous drunk driving statute
which was OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4511.19 (Anderson 1982). The defendant in Gasser was
charged under the old statute.
65. Gasser, 5 Ohio App. 3d at 217, 451 N.E.2d at 250.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.at 218, 451 N.E.2d at 251.
69. Id.at 217-18, 451 N.E.2d at 250-51.
70. Id. at 220, 451 N.E.2d at 252.
71. Id. at 220, 451 N.E.2d at 252-53.
72. This firmly rests the burden of proving proper procedure on the state. It should be noted
that the Gasser court's decision encompasses a wide scope because the court held that the state
has the burden of proof to show that it has not disregarded any of the requirements.that defendant
has put forth in his motion. Id. at 219, 451 N.E.2d at 252.
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State v. Halko.73 In Halko, the Court of Appeals for Hamilton
County, Ohio placed the burden of going forward on the defendant who
filed a pretrial motion to suppress breathalyzer evidence.74 Gregory K.
Halko was arrested and charged with violating Ohio Revised Code section 4511.19(A)(3) 7 5 which forbids operating a motor vehicle with a
breath concentration of more than ten-hundreths of one gram of alcohol per two hundred ten liters of breath. 76 The defendant moved to
suppress the following: (1) The arrest, for lack of probable cause; (2)
any statements made by him during the arrest; and, (3) the results of
the breathalyzer test.77 Neither the state nor the defendant presented
any evidence at the suppression hearing.78 The trial court suppressed
the results of the breathalyzer test.79
In reversing the lower court's decision, the court of appeals reasoned that the appellee did not present evidence to support his motion
to suppress.8 0 Further, the court relied on its previous decision in State
v. Banks" 1 stating,
Although State v. Banks ...did not arise as a traffic violation, its holding has equal application to all criminal cases. 'A criminal defendant at
a motion to suppress hearing has the burden of going forward with evidence to raise the issue that the evidence should be suppressed. The state
then beats the burden of persuasion to convince the court that such evidence should not be suppressed.'82
The two previous cases illustrate the conflict that the Ohio appellate courts experienced regarding the procedural issue of burden allocation on a motion to suppress breathalyzer evidence. Gasser held that
the state must move forward to defeat defendants' motions to suppress
evidence. 83 Conversely, Halko held that in all criminal cases, the defendant-movant has the burden of going forward with evidence at a
suppression hearing.8 4 In this regard Wallace quieted conflict in the
lower state appellate courts.
The case of City of Xenia v. Wallace, 5 has further significance

73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

No C-850656, slip op. (Ist. App. Dist. July 16, 1986).
Id.
Id.; OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 4511.19(A)(3) (Anderson 1987).
OtIo REV. CODE ANN. § 4511.19(A)(3).
Halko, No. C-850656, slip op. (Ist. App. Dist. July 16, 1986).
Id.
Id. Parts one and two of the defendant's motion were overruled.
Id.
No. C-790217, slip op. (lst App. Dist. Jan. 20, 1980).
Halko, No. C-850656, slip op. (1st. App. Dist. July 16, 1986).
Gasser, 5 Ohio App. 3d at 217, 451 N.E.2d at 249.
Halko, No. C-850656, slip op. (1st. App. Dist. July 16, 1986).
37 Ohio St. 3d 216, 524 N.E.2d 889 (1988).
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due to a change in the driving while intoxicated laws of Ohio which
became effective on March 16, 1983.8' The prior law 87 was a typical
statute that prohibited operation of a motor vehicle while under the
influence of alcohol or drugs.88 The revised statute added subsections
one through four to former section 4511.19(A). 9 Subsection one is the
old section 4511.19(A).90 The next three subsections involve the new
"presumption offenses" which presume intoxication if a person has a
certain percentage of alcohol in his blood, breath,9" or urine.92 The
Wallace case addresses only Ohio Revised Code section
4511.19(A)(3), 93 known as the breath presumption offense. That section provides a presumption of intoxication if a person has ten-hundredths of one gram or more by weight of alcohol per two hundred ten
liters of breath.9 In Ohio, there is a preference for a charge under
section 4511.19(A)(3). When a defendant is charged with both section
4511.19(A)(1), general intoxication, and section 4511.19(A)(3), dis95
missal of the section 4511.19(A)(1) charge is proper.
Given this preference for the breath concentration charge, the admissibility of the breathalyzer test results becomes crucial. 9 The ideal
defense tactic is to attack the breathalyzer evidence and ruin the prosecution's case. The most obvious avenue of attack would be to suppress
the evidence of the test. 97 Confusion has resulted in the appellate

86. 1982 Ohio Legis. Serv. 504-06 (Baldwin).
87. The old law contained no specific provisions for breath, blood or urine test levels, See
OI-o REV. CODE ANN § 4511.19 (Anderson 1982).
88. Id.
89. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 4511.19(A)(l)-(4). The statute provides no person shall operate any vehicle, streetcar, or trackless trolley within the state if any of the following apply:
(1) The person is under the influence of alcohol or any drug of abuse, or the combined
influence of alcohol and any drug of abuse;
(2) The person has a concentration of ten-hundredths of one percent or more by weight of
alcohol in his blood;
(3) The person has a concentration of ten-hundredths of one gram or more by weight of
alcohol per two hundred ten liters of his breath;
(4) The person has a concentration of fourteen-hundredths of one gram or more by weight
of alcohol per one hundred milliters of his urine.
Id.
90. Id. § 4511.19(A)(1).
91. Id. § 4511.19(A)(3).
92. Id. § 4511.19(A)(4).
93. Id. § 4511.19(A)(3).
94. Id.
95. State v. Babb, No. C-860028, slip op. (1st App. Dist. Jan. 30, 1987).
96. This is because of the ease of obtaining the results and because it is the least intrusive.
Further, without this evidence the breath concentration charge becomes moot.
97. A suppression of the breathalyzer evidence would destroy the prosecution's ability to
prove the breath concentration charge.
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courts98 regarding which party has the burden of going forward with
evidence at the suppression hearings.9 9 It became necessary for the
Ohio Supreme Court to delineate specific guidelines regarding motion
to suppress hearings and the applicable evidentiary burden. Thus, the
court addressed the conflict in Wallace.

IV.

ANALYSIS

A. The Wallace Decision is Consistent with Notions of Judicial
Fairness
The allocation of the burdens of proof1 "0 at a motion to suppress
hearing can be crucial because in most cases, the party who has the
burden of pleading a fact will have both the burden of producing evidence for that issue, as well as the burden of peiuasion on the issue."'
This situation takes on particular significance in City of Xenia v. Wallace' O2 because, as noted above, the Wallace court allocated the burden
of going forward to the prosecution, despite the fact that the defendant
plead the motion.103 This decision to place the burden of going forward
on the prosecution is judicially fair. As one commentator noted,
With respect to the issue which is usually central in a motion to suppress
hearing-the reasonableness of the challenged search or seizure-most
states follow the rule which is utilized in the federal courts: if the search
or seizure was pursuant to a warrant, the defendant has the burden of
proof; but if the police acted without a warrant the burden of proof is on
the prosecution. 04
This warrant/no warrant dichotomy is derived from the nature of
the warrant requirement. If a warrant was issued, a magistrate has already independently determined probable cause existed. 0 5 Conversely,
"[slearches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by a judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the
Fourth Amendment."'0 6 Therefore, in a case involving a warrantless
search, the issue of probable cause becomes significant because it
speaks to the reasonableness of the search. 0 7 Further, the burden of
proving or disproving the probable cause issue becomes crucial at a
98. See supra notes 65-84 and accompanying text.
99. See supra notes 62-82.
100. See supra notes 52-60 and accompanying text.
101. See infra notes 120-33 and accompanying text.
102. 37 Ohio St. 3d 216, 524 N.E.2d 889 (1988).
103. Id. at 219, 524 N.E.2d at 892.
104. W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE 499 (1978).
105. Malcolme v. United States, 332 A.2d 917, 918 (D.C. 1975).
106. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967).
107. Under the fourth amendment all searches must be reasonable. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.

Published by eCommons, 1988

UNIVERSITY OF DAYTON LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 14:3

motion to suppress hearing.
Realistically it is virtually impossible for a defendant to prove lack
of probable cause because it is difficult to prove the nonexistence of a
fact. 10 8 Further, as one court noted, "because the evidence allegedly
constituting probable cause is solely within the knowledge and control
of the arresting officers, they should bear the additional burden of establishing that probable cause in fact existed."' 9
The Wallace decision embraces the warrant/no warrant dichotomy, noting that the state is in a better position to gather information
on the issue of probable cause."' In determining that "[liaw enforcement searches and seizures without the authority of a warrant are not
entitled to a presumption of legality,""' the Wallace court exhibited
reliance upon the dichotomy. "Fairness demands that this distinction
be drawn and that the government bear the burden of proof at least in
cases of warrantless searches.""' 2 Unless the government bears the burden of proof, there would be little incentive for police officers to seek a
warrant." 3 In addition to this deterrent effect, common sense dictates
that to allocate the burden of going forward with evidence to a defendant would be judicially unfair." 4 A defendant "cannot be expected to
prove a lack of some item until he knows on what the government bases
its claim of its existence.""' 5
The use of the warrant/no warrant dichotomy is judicially fair. It
should be the state's burden to show exceptions to the warrant requirement."' Thus, the Wallace court placed the defendant in a judicially
fair position in relation to the burden of going forward." 7 Secondly, the
Wallace court addressed procedural aspects of the motion to suppress." 8 By holding that the defendant must clarify the grounds on
which he challenges the search, 119 the prosecution will receive the notice it needs to prepare its case. This balance between the needs of the

108. Comment, Probable Cause: The Federal Standard, 25 OHIo ST. L.J. 502, 528 (1964).
109. United States v. Longmire, 761 F.2d 411, 417 (7th Cir. 1985).
I10. Wallace, 37 Ohio St. 3d at 220, 524 N.E.2d at 893. This can be drawn from the
Wallace court's acceptance that warrantless searches are per se unreasonable, and that the state
must prove an exception. Id.
Ill. Id.
112. Comment, supra note 108, at 528.
113. Longmire, 761 F.2d at 417.
114. See infra note 116.
115. Comment, supra note 108, at 528.
116. It would only seem logical that when the state does not use a warrant, it should prove
the exception. See generally Coolidge V. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971).
117. To hold otherwise would be to place defendant in a very difficult position. See supra
notes 38, 110-11 and accompanying text.
118. Wallace, 37 Ohio St. 3d at 219, 524 N.E.2d at 891-892.
119. Id.
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prosecution and the needs of the defendant suggests consistency with
notions of judicial fairness.
B. The Structure of the Wallace Opinion Allows a Broader Application in the Future
The structure of the Wallace opinion, as well as its language,
reveals the court's approach to the issue of suppressing evidence obtained through a warrantless search.
The first part of the Wallace opinion is procedural. 20 In this section, the court states that the procedural requirements outlined are
designed to suppress evidence obtained through a warrantless search. 2 '
The court did not require that the challenge must be based on probable
cause, although such was the case in Wallace.'22 Rather, this section
determined that the defendant must "give the prosecutor notice of the
basis of the challenge."' 12 3 This section of the opinion confirms the
court's acceptance of the warrant/no warrant dichotomy.' 2 4 The court
realized that not all warrantless searches are challenged on a lack of
probable cause.2 5
Section two of the opinion discusses probable cause.'
Here, the
court addressed the arguments for and against placing the burden of
going forward upon the state. 2 7 The important aspect of this section is
the last paragraph in which the court held that the state bears the burden of going forward on the issue of probable cause.' 2 8 Conspicuously
absent from this section are any qualifiers or fact applications. It is not
until the third section that the court applies the specific facts of this
case to the two previous sections. 2 9
The structural logic of this opinion indicates that it may be useful
in the future as a broad framework and authority for challenging warrantless searches on grounds other than probable cause. Clearly the
first part of the opinion is left open to a broad reading since the court

120. Id. at 218-19, 524 N.E.2d at 891-92.
121. Id. at 218, 524 N.E.2d at 891.
122. Id. at 219, 524 N.E.2d at 892. The court held in this section that to suppress evidence
of a "warrantless" search the defendant must demonstrate a lack of warrant and raise the grounds
on which the challenge is based. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id. The 'court here is accepting the fact that warrantless searches are challenged on
other grounds because no qualifiers exist to keep this section within the realm of probable cause.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 219, 524 N.E.2d at 892.
127. ld.; see also supra notes 36-41 and accompanying text.
128. Wallace, 37 Ohio St. 3d at 219, 524 N.E.2d at 893.
129. For a discussion of the court's application of the facts, see supra notes 45-51 and
accompanying text.
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did not limit the grounds which could be plead. 130 Thus, the logic of the
opinion could be applicable to challenges based on lack of exigent circumstances, consent, or hot pursuit. 31 Conceivably, this case has set
the standard for all warrantless searches. The court in Wallace did not
discuss any application of facts until it laid out a path for analysis in its
first two sections. Therefore, it is logical that the facts of any given
warrantless search could fit into the Wallace framework. 32
In summary, once a defendant proves a warrantless search occurred, the state bears the burden of going forward with evidence to
justify the intrusion.' 3 3 Thus, the Wallace analysis has the potential to
be applied to different fact patterns that meet the particular framework
of the opinion. Therefore, the logic of this opinion should not be confined to motions to suppress breathalyzer evidence.
C.

The Decision in Wallace is Consistent with Other Jurisdictions

Because the Wallace court embraced the warrant/no warrant dichotomy,13 1 the decision brings Ohio within the majority of other state
jurisdictions. The majority of states that have ruled on the issue of burden allocation have accepted that warrantless searches are per se unreasonable." 5 Once this basic premise is accepted, the burden is placed
upon the state to prove an exception to the warrant requirement.'
There is a wealth of case law from the other states which embraces this dichotomy. A discussion of several cases will illustrate how
other jurisdictions have employed the warrant/no warrant dichotomy
and allocated the burden of proof to the state. In Commonwealth v.
130. Wallace, 37 Ohio St. 3d at 219, 524 N.E.2d at 892.
131. This logic is derived from the case because it forces the state to prove exceptions to the
warrant requirement. Once the prosecutor has notice of the grounds of the challenge, the warrant/
no warrant dichotomy seems to call for the state to bear the burden of going forward with evidence to prove any exception. Wallace held that this is the case with respect to probable cause. id.
at 220, 524 N.E.2d at 893. Taking this one step further, the warrant requirement may require
that this burden be placed upon the state, regardless of the exception the state puts forth. See
generally Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971); United States v. Longmire, 761 F.2d
411 (7th Cir. 1985).
132. See supra discussion in note 131.
133. Wallace, 37 Ohio St. 3d at 220, 524 N.E.2d at 893. Thus, attorneys should be cognizant of the possibility that this case may have broader application than the facts specifically at
issue in Wallace.
134. See supra notes 105-15 and accompanying text.
135. See generally State v. Fisher, 141 Ariz. 227, 686 P.2d 750, cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1066
(1984)(per se unreasonable); People v. Stoppel, 637 P.2d 384, .389 (Colo. 1981)(presumptively
invalid); People v. Knapp, 52 N.Y.2d 689, 694, 422 N.E.2d 531, 534, 439 N.Y.S.2d 871, 874
(1981)(per se unreasonable). The Knapp court stated, "[F]urther to militate against any rationalizing away of these protections, the burden of providing the existence of sufficiently exceptional
circumstances is placed squarely on the shoulders of the government." Id. (citations omitted).
136. See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971); United States v. Longmire,
761 F.2d 411 (7th Cir. 1985).
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Rodriquez, 3 ' the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that
"[slearches and seizures conducted outside the scope of valid warrants
are presumed to be unreasonable. In such circumstances, the burden is
on the Commonwealth to show that the search or seizure falls within a
narrow class of permissible exceptions." 13' 8 Rodriquez addressed
whether evidence seized from a defendant's apartment was outside the
scope of the plain view doctrine.1 39 The articles that were seized were
gathered during a search which was not judicially sanctioned. 4 0 However, the state was found to have sufficiently proven probable cause.1 4'
In State v. Riley, 42 the Missouri Court of Appeals for the Eastern
District of the Fourth Division held that "[i]n a motion to suppress the
burden of going forward with the evidence and risk of nonpersuasion is
on the State to show by a preponderance of the evidence that the motion should be overruled."' 4 3 Riley addressed whether probable cause to
arrest the defendant existed and, if such probable cause did exist,
whether it would justify the search.' 44 Riley was "arrested" and
brought to the police station.' 4 5 There he was held by three officers
while one removed a package from his mouth. 4" The contents of the
package were later identified as heroin. 4 7 The defendant filed a motion
to suppress the evidence and the trial court denied the motion.' 4 8 Applying the reasoning cited above, the appellate court reversed.' 49
In State v. Slaughter,'50 the Supreme Court of Georgia used the
warrant/no warrant dichotomy.' 51 The court considered the denial of
the defendant's motion to suppress evidence. 5 2 In affirming the lower
appellate court's decision, the supreme court stated:
Because the burden is on those officers who conduct a search without a
warrant to show that the search was conducted pursuant to an exception
to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement, it can be said that a
search without a warrant is presumed to be invalid and the burden is on
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138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.

378 Mass. 296, 391 N.E.2d 889 (1979).
Id. at 303, 391 N.E.2d at 893.
Id. at 302-04, 391 N.E.2d at 893-94.
Id. at 304, 391 N.E.2d at 893.
Id. 304, 391 N.E.2d at 894.
704 S.W.2d 691 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986).
Id. at.692.
Id. at 693-94.
Id. at 693.
Id.
Id. at 693.
Id.
Id.at 694-95.
252 Ga. 435, 315 S.E.2d 865 (1984).
Id. at 436-37, 315 S.E.2d at 867.
Id. at 435, 315 S.E.2d at 866-67.
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the state to show that the warrantless search was valid. 153
Slaughter presented a motion to suppress challenge, claiming that the
state did not procure a valid warrant. 6 4
These three cases have been chosen to demonstrate how the burden is allocated to the state when there is a motion to suppress evidence
seized by a warrantless search. These cases provide a broader and
fuller understanding of how the Wallace decision mirrors the framework of other jurisdictions. More specifically, these opinions show that
other jurisdictions have accepted the warrant/no warrant dichotomy
and that analysis of different fact situations may open the Wallace
opinion to an avenue of wider application in the future.
D.

The Effect of Wallace on Current Defense Practice

The decision in Wallace has several ramifications for practicing
defense attorneys. The purpose of a suppression hearing is to decide
whether certain evidence will be admitted at trial.' 55 Since this process
can be crucial to whether the case against a criminal defendant will
succeed, several key aspects of the suppression hearing should be kept
in the defense attorney's mind, particularly in light of the Wallace
decision.
First, the Wallace court determined that defense counsel must, in
a motion to suppress evidence, specifically state the grounds for challenging the warrantless search.? 6 This aspect of the opinion is very important. Although the adversarial system compels a defense attorney to
keep as much of his case as possible out of the eyes of the prosecution,
the defending attorney must be careful to lay out the specific guidelines
of his motion. This is important for two reasons. First, Wallace specifically requires such pleading.1 57 Second, defense counsel must be careful
to clarify his motion to avoid losing the right to appeal. "[W]here a
defendant fails to assert a particular ground for suppressing unlawfully
obtained evidence in the trial court, an appellate court will not consider
that ground on appeal."' 58, The reasoning of this position is two-fold.
Primarily, this requirement of specificity works directly into the logic of
the Wallace court's decision.1 59 Secondly, it is clear that the concept of

153. Id. at 436, 315 S.E.2d at 867.
154. Id. at 435, 315 S.E.2d at 866.
155. S. BRENT & S. STILLER, HANDLING DRUNK DRIVING CASES 335 (1985).
156. Wallace, 37 Ohio St. 3d at 219, 524 N.E.2d at 892.
157. Id.
158. State v. Carter, 707 P.2d 656, 660 (Utah 1985).
159. The Wallace court required specificity in pleading for two reasons. The first was to
give notice to the prosecution. The second was to avoid waiver of the right to appeal. Wallace, 37
Ohio St. 3d at 218, 524 N.E.2d at 892.
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judicial economy would be best served by such a holding. It would
make no sense to allow defendants to raise appeals on issues that
should have been decided at the trial court level. Defense counsel must
strike a balance between prudently releasing strategy and meeting the
requirement of specificity to insure the right to appeal.1"'
The other important aspect of the Wallace decision concerns witnesses. Since the state must move forward with evidence to show probable cause,"' the prosecution will have to call witnesses. This is an
effective time for defense counsel to attack the state's case. "Often,
defense counsel's best opportunity to make inroads in the prosecution's
case comes from cross-examining the prosecution witnesses, rather than
presenting a defense case." ' 2 Because the defense attorney will now be
aware that the prosecution will be bringing forth evidence to show
probable cause, a good counter strategy can be delivered for victory at
the suppression hearing.
V.

CONCLUSION

The decision in City of Xenia v. Wallace1 13 was a judicially fair
opinion. The Wallace court placed both parties in the best possible position in relation to the burden of proof. Secondly, the structure of the
Wallace opinion, and the logic which can be derived from it, may allow
application of this reasoning to other areas in the future. Further, the
Wallace opinion fits into the general framework of other jurisdictions.
The acceptance of the warrant/no warrant dichotomy by the Wallace
court allows its analogy with other warrantless search opinions. Lastly,
the court's decision in Wallace should be recognized by practicing defense attorneys to assure effective drafting of motions to suppress evidence in relation to this and possibly other warrantless search issues.
Thomas J. Dillon

160.
161.
162.
163.

Careful drafting will be the key to this challenge.
Wallace, 37 Ohio St. 3d at 220, 524 N.E.2d at 893.
S. BRENT & S. STILLER, supra note 155, at 338.
37 Ohio St. 3d 216, 524 N.E.2d 889 (1988).
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